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Internal Auditing—A Historical Perspective and
Future Directions
Victor Z. Brink
Columbia University, Professor Emeritus
A n inquiry into the history and forward directions of internal auditing can
best begin with a definition. In the new Standards for the Practice of Internal
A u d i t i n g just issued by T h e Institute of Internal Auditors, internal auditing is
defined as " . . . an independent appraisal function established within an organization to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the organization."
T h e Standards then go on to say that " T h e objective of internal auditing is to
assist members of the organization i n the effective discharge of their responsibilities. T o this end, internal auditing furnishes them w i t h analyses, appraisals,
recommendations, counsel, and information concerning the activities reviewed.
T h e members of the organization assisted by internal auditing include those in
management and the board of directors. Internal auditors owe a responsibility
to both, providing them w i t h information about the adequacy and effectiveness
of the organization's system of internal control and the quality of performance."
The reference to internal control is further clarified i n the Statement of Responsibilities issued by the same Institute where internal auditing is described as
" . . . a managerial control which functions i n measuring and evaluating the
effectiveness of other controls." A l l of these statements confirm the broad constructive nature of internal auditing.
T h e fact that the term "internal auditing" includes the word " a u d i t i n g , "
and the fact that the work of the external auditor—the independent public accountant—also has to do w i t h " a u d i t i n g , " suggests that the only difference between the two professional activities is whether the individual is an employee
of the organization or is engaged as an outside professional on a contractual basis.
T h e fallacy of that oversimplified view can be shown by comparing the respective
missions of internal and external auditors. In the latter case—if we exclude the
wide range of special consulting services—the primary mission of the external
auditor is to examine the annual financial statements of the organization i n such
depth as to make possible the expression of an opinion as to their fairness i n
conformity w i t h generally accepted accounting principles. That opinion i n part
is sought by the board of directors and corporate management for their o w n
use, but even more for the outside parties who rely on the financial statements—
creditors, investors, government, and the like. In carrying out this extended
mission, the external auditor functions as an independent agent for a negotiated
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fee, and hence has a certain degree of independence inherent i n that detached
status.
T h e internal auditor, on the other hand, is an employee of the organization
w i t h a major mission of serving that organization i n a variety of ways. T h e
services rendered pertain to the effectiveness of both internal procedures and
the related operations. T h e service has to do w i t h all kinds of internal activities
and interprets effectiveness to include both efficiency and profitability. T h e i n ternal auditor has no direct responsibility to third parties such as creditors, i n vestors, or government. Moreover, being an employee of the organization unavoidably restricts the level of independence as compared to that enjoyed by the
external auditor. A t the same time, however, it should be recognized that the
two missions are not isolated from each other. Instead, as each audit group
carries out its primary mission, there are intermediate and secondary concerns
which involve common interests. In both cases there is an underlying need for
sound internal control and the related policies, procedures, and day to day
activities. Likewise i n both cases, that internal control is viewed as a means to
the end of carrying out the primary mission.
Historical Development
If we wish to adequately understand contemporary issues, it is always helpful
to look back at historical developments and to review the manner i n which the
currently existing situation emerged. It, therefore, seems appropriate that we
follow that approach for internal auditing. In doing this, we recognize that how
far one goes back into history is bound to be arbitrary. Moreover, the applicability
of the study of history always has its limitations because of changing environmental conditions. W e also recognize that all organizations and all internal
audit groups are different and that each situation involves a response to its o w n
environment i n a distinctive manner. Nevertheless, it can still be useful to
review the past to assist i n understanding the present and for projecting what
may lie ahead.
In the case of internal auditing, we k n o w that internal auditing as a concept
has existed as early as there have been substantive human relationships.
Conscientious people have always been concerned w i t h the extent of compliance w i t h instructions, the reliability of information, and the effectiveness of
results—whether carried out as a part of regular operational responsibilities or
by various subordinates, however they might be designated. W e select 1941,
however, as our first historical reference point. W e do this on the personal side
because this was the year that the author completed his doctoral research under
Professor Roy B . Kester at Columbia University covering the nature and scope
of internal auditing, and which became the basis for the first major book i n the
field, Internal A u d i t i n g , Principles and Practice, which was published by T h e
Ronald Press Company. T h e year 1941 is, however, more noteworthy because it
was the year i n which T h e Institute of Internal Auditors was founded—an event
i n w h i c h the author was privileged to be an active participant.
I n 1941 there were a number of internal auditing departments, but they
existed only i n a small proportion of the organizations that had need for such
services. These internal audit groups concentrated on compliance with lower
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level accounting and operational procedures, protection of assets, and detection
of fraud. There was at that time, however, an increasing awareness of the
growing size and complexity of all kinds of operations by business, government,
and other types of organizations. T h e external auditor was also becoming i n creasingly concerned with those same problems, and especially how they i m pinged upon the responsibilities of that profession. There was i n total a growing
recognition that internal auditing departments could make an important contribution to coping w i t h the emerging complexities.
T h e response to the foregoing was a new wave of strengthening existing
internal auditing departments and creating new internal auditing departments
when such audit groups did not already exist. External auditors i n many cases
were the parties recommending new internal auditing departments and/or
being called in to help work out the needed expansion of audit effort i n their
client companies. In many situations, the internal audit personnel were supplied
or recruited by external auditors, and then trained and guided by them. It was
inevitable, therefore, that internal auditing efforts would be very supportive of
external auditor needs and relatively closely coordinated to assure the greater
reliability of financial statements. T h i s meant that internal auditing efforts were
especially directed to accounting procedures and related lower level compliance,
as previously indicated, rather than to broader improvement, operational effectiveness, and greater profitability. T h e existing internal auditing departments
also typically reported to one of the lower ranking financial executives—more
often to the officer responsible for accounting activities. T h i s was the typical
situation, although the writer's research preceding the completion of the aforementioned book showed that some business corporations had very progressive
and sophisticated internal auditing departments.
Formation of The Institute of Internal Auditors
A s previously mentioned, 1941 was also the year when a group of forwardlooking internal auditors became discontented w i t h the orientation of existing
professional associations and decided that a new professional organization should
be established and devoted exclusively to the professional interests of internal
auditors. T h i s decision marked the creation of T h e Institute of Internal Auditors
w i t h twenty-four charter members. John B . Thurston, the head of the internal
auditing department at N o r t h American Company—a large public utility—was
the moving force, and he became the new Institute's first president. Later,
Thurston also wrote a book on internal auditing: Basic Internal
Auditing
Principles and Techniques, published by International Textbook Company.
D u r i n g the years following 1941—and especially following W o r l d W a r II—a
number of interrelated forces were at work. There was first of all a continuing
expansion of the size and complexity of organizations—business corporations,
governmental bodies, and philanthropic organizations. Business corporations
were also becoming increasingly diversified and extended geographically—including more and more international operations. A s a result, there were additional concerns of both management and external auditors and a related effort
to further expand and upgrade internal auditing groups. Also management became increasingly aware of the desirability of getting more benefits from the
3

very substantial amounts of money expended to maintain internal auditors, and
therefore, was motivated to use them i n connection with broader operational problems to which these internal auditors were concurrently being exposed.
Operational Auditing Introduced
A t the same time, internal auditors were increasingly aware of the further
opportunities to go beyond the narrower protective role and to make more substantial and dynamic contributions to management welfare. A n d when management responded favorably to the extension of the services rendered there was
all the more incentive for internal auditors to move even more aggressively. T h i s
new emphasis of internal auditors, over and above their more traditional financial
auditing role, came to be k n o w n as "operational auditing." A s a result, internal
auditing broadened i n professional scope and attracted individuals of greater
capabilities. T h e higher level contribution of internal auditors also brought with
it new visibility w i t h management, resulting i n better organizational status and
higher monetary rewards.
In most situations, the expansion into operational auditing was built on
and integrated w i t h the so-called more traditional financial auditing. In other
situations the enthusiasm for the more dynamic operational auditing resulted i n
some reduction or contraction of the earlier financial auditing. In the latter cases,
there was some weakening of the ties to the external auditors and a resulting
reduction i n the reliance placed on internal audit work. W h i l e again there were
all types of situations, on average internal auditing came to focus on organizational effectiveness i n terms of improved operational results and greater profitability. A n understanding of this expanded role of the internal auditor is very i m portant as we appraise the contemporary scene, with its new pressures, and the
resulting alternative directions i n which internal auditing may move.
Other Developments
T h e developments over the years since 1941 have also included some situations where the services provided by the internal audit department have been
expanded to go beyond the needs of officers of the operating organization and
to also be directed toward the needs of the board of directors. In some cases,
there were new dotted-line-type organizational relationships to the board of
directors and, i n a few cases, solid-line-type reporting responsibility. (Dotted
line describes those situations where there are partial responsibilities and solid
line refers to situations where there is primary administrative responsibility.)
T h e latter situation has more often come to pass i n the banking and insurance
industries where the handling of cash and negotiable securities, w i t h the related
higher level of risk exposure, has resulted i n increased concerns of boards of d i rectors. Industry wide, however, the relationship of the internal audit group to
the board has been less structured and often not clearly defined.
A final significant aspect of the thirty-five plus years which have elapsed
since 1941 pertains to the growth of the professional association founded i n that
earlier year. T h i s association—The Institute of Internal Auditors—over the ensuing years has grown from its initial charter group of 24 to an international
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organization with over 16,000 members, with over 130 chapters, and with a
headquarters staff of some 55 persons. T h e activities of The Institute have
come to include a substantial research program, the development and administration of educational seminars, the publication of a professional journal and major
books and monographs, the development of an effective interface w i t h other
parties interested i n internal auditing, formulation of professional standards, a
certification program (Certified Internal A u d i t o r ) , and a wide range of other
membership services. The composite result has been an integral part of the
expanding professional status of internal auditing.*
The Contemporary Scene
T h e internal auditing profession has developed i n more recent years to a
level where it serves a wide range of organizational needs. T h e services rendered,
as we have seen, typically cover both the financial and operational dimensions
of organizational activities. T h e services rendered can, as we also have seen, be
viewed as covering both protective needs and all kinds of improvement. T h i s
total range is outlined more specifically i n the earlier mentioned Statement of
Responsibilities of Internal Auditors, as follows:
T h e objective of internal auditing is to assist all members of management i n the effective discharge of their responsibilities by furnishing
them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent comments concerning the activities reviewed. Internal auditors are concerned with any phase of business activity i n which they may be of
service to management. T h i s involves going beyond the accounting
and financial records to obtain a full understanding of the operations
under review. T h e attainment of this overall objective involves such
activities as:
• Reviewing and appraising the soundness, adequacy, and application
of accounting, financial, and other operating controls, and promoting
effective control at reasonable cost
• Ascertaining the extent of compliance with established policies, plans,
and procedures
• Ascertaining the extent to which company assets are accounted for and
safeguarded from losses of all kinds
• Ascertaining the reliability of management data developed within the
organization
• Appraising the quality of performance in carrying out assigned
responsibilities
• Recommending operating improvements.
T h e above portion of the Statement of Responsibilities is a helpful elaboration of the internal auditor's role i n several ways. In the first sentence it describes very concisely how the internal auditor discharges his or her responsi* The history of the Institute of Internal Auditors is presented in further detail in
"Foundations for Unlimited Horizons—The Institute of Internal Auditors 1941-1976" written
by the author of this paper, and published by The Institute of Internal Auditors.
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bilities through providing analysis, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent
comments covering the activities reviewed.
T h e six types of activities cited are also helpful because of the more precise
identification of those that are primarily protective i n nature (the second, third,
and fourth) and those that are primarily directed to further improvement (the
first, fifth, and sixth). In actual practice, the recommendations for improvement
are developed to a major extent by building upon the more routine protective
type activities. Both types of service are very important but it is the development
of improvements that has demonstrated the most dynamic professional potentials
for internal auditors.
In the previously mentioned Standards, the work of the internal auditor is
covered by standards and guidelines i n five areas as follows:
1. T h e independence of the internal auditing department from the
activities audited, and the objectivity of internal auditors.
2. T h e proficiency of internal auditors and the professional care they
should exercise.
3. T h e scope of internal auditing work.
4. T h e performance of internal auditing assignments.
5. T h e management of the internal auditing department.
O f special interest for educators is the portion of the second area of the
Standards that deals w i t h the knowledge, skills, and disciplines needed by i n ternal auditors. Included here are the statements that:
• Proficiency i n accounting principles and techniques is required of
auditors who work extensively w i t h financial records and reports.
• A n understanding of management principles is required to recognize
and evaluate materiality and significance of deviations from good
business practice.
• A n appreciation is required of the fundamentals of such subjects as
accounting, economics, commercial law, taxation, finance, quantitative
methods, and computerized information systems.
T h i s broad coverage of required qualifications springs from the fact that
the internal auditor is reviewing all types of organizational activities. It does,
however, complicate the problem of where i n the undergraduate and graduate
business schools the responsibility for education of internal auditors should be
centered.
The Changing Contemporary Situation
In more recent years, there have been a number of important developments
which impact directly and indirectly o n both business organizations and the
independent public accountants who serve them. In the case of the business
organization, the impact bears on both the management group responsible for
operations and the board of directors to w h o m the operational group is responsible. These impacts i n turn flow through to a considerable extent to the internal
auditors i n those same organizations. T h e underlying developments have cre6

ated new pressures which bear importantly on the continuing roles and responsibilities of all of the aforementioned parties of interest.
T h e new developments can be viewed i n the most general terms as due to
new expectations of the total society pertaining to the quality of life. In more
specific terms, the new expectations run to the protection of the physical environment, the conservation of natural resources, elimination of poverty, providing greater equal opportunity to people, the satisfaction of higher level human
needs, and higher standards of morality. These expectations have always existed
over time, but the current situation is characterized by an acceleration of these
expectations, with a related demand for more immediate and more substantive
corrective action. These new expectations have increasingly focused on business
corporations, because of their relatively greater visibility, resources, and power.
A t the same time, individual instances of deficiencies of corporate conduct i n
various areas of corporate activity have fanned the flames of the new demands
for corrective action.
A l l of these pressures have combined to cause a rising dissatisfaction w i t h
business organizations and those responsible for their operations, plus a substantial loss of confidence i n the integrity and trustworthiness of business leaders.
T h e pressures have been exerted i n a number of ways. In the case of corporate
management, there is the new emphasis on adhering to higher standards of
conduct, better accounting policies, and for more comprehensive and more
effective systems of internal control. F o r boards of directors there are pressures
for greater involvement i n corporate affairs, a deeper sense of both shareholder
and social responsibility, and a greater use of audit committees. A n d i n the
public accounting area, there are pressures for greater independence and a
higher and more definitive level of responsibility. T h e aroused public opinion
has been expressed principally through demands for new legislation and greater
governmental regulation and control.
T h e result of all of the various new pressures just described is to some extent
to further involve the internal auditor. W i t h the internal auditor's traditional
focus on compliance and internal control, it is natural that all parties of interest
tend to see the internal auditing group as a useful contributor to the solution
of existing problems, and more specifically as a helpful ally i n the accomplishment of their o w n particular objectives. T h e question thereby posed for the
internal auditor is how to respond to the new greater needs, and w i t h a further
question as to what the priorities should be i n serving the particular needs of
the various parties of interest. T h e latter question may of course be taken out of
the internal auditor's hands by the decisions of higher authority, including specific legislation. A t the same time, however, internal auditors are endeavoring
to make their o w n appraisals of what is best i n terms of their o w n self-interest
and the needs of the larger society. T h i s requires reconciliation and resolution
of any existing conflicts, and then help i n a constructive way to shape the
evolving pressures and demands by higher authority. A l l of this raises questions
of what is the best ongoing role and what are the related responsibilities for
the internal auditor now and i n the years ahead? W h a t are the alternatives and
how do they impinge both upon the responsibilities of the other parties of
interest and the total social welfare? A n d then, i n the light of those choices,
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what should be the nature and scope of internal auditing practice for implementing the selected role over the foreseeable future?
Whither Internal Auditing
There are many ways that internal auditors might respond to the new
pressures on business organizations and independent public accountants. In all
of the various alternatives there is, however, a central issue of what priorities
should be given to services to corporate management versus services to the board
of directors. In this connection there are various sets of arrangements which
could i n some way separate or integrate these priorities. These alternative arrangements extend from the extreme of solely serving corporate management to
that of solely serving the board, with various types of intermediate combinations.
W e propose to evaluate the two extreme alternatives and then to appraise the
merits of various types of combined orientation. In that way we can best understand the trade-offs involved as one moves from one extreme to the other, and
perhaps be in a better position to find the proper balance.
Let us begin with the possibility that the internal audit group is to be
exclusively dedicated to the service of the operational organization and its corporate management. T h e merits of such an arrangement are that the corporate
management can then use the internal audit group to fully serve its o w n managerial needs, free from any outside restrictions. Presumably, under such conditions the emphasis of internal auditing would be primarily on operational auditing, but plus whatever financial auditing activities the corporate management
believes appropriate i n discharging its own responsibilities to the board. One
could perhaps argue that this arrangement would best exploit the already proven
capabilities of internal auditors to achieve m a x i m u m profitability of the operating
organization. T h e internal auditor would at the same time find life a bit
simpler i n that reporting allegiance would be only to the corporate management.
Under this arrangement, however, the board of directors and its audit committee
would presumably have to depend more on the independent public accountant
to take care of their o w n needs, or alternatively create a new audit group to
provide some of the needed services.
N o w let us take the other extreme and assume that the existing internal
audit group is exclusively responsible to the board of directors—most likely via
its audit committee. N o w the internal audit department would emphasize protecting the responsibilities of the board and would presumably concentrate on
the more traditional objectives of compliance, protection, and integrity. T o the
extent that the board extended its operational involvement, it would also have
the seasoned internal audit group to assist it i n those endeavors. Under this
arrangement, however, the role of the internal auditor would appear more likely
to identify with that of the external auditor. There might also be some conflict
between the work of the internal auditor and the operating organization because
the internal auditor, to a considerable extent, would be checking on corporate
management for the account of the audit committee. Presumably the internal
auditor would take on a more powerful protective role, but that could be directly
or indirectly undermining, or even giving up, the present major stake i n operational auditing. It is also most likely—if not inevitable—that corporate manage8

merit would seek to obtain operational auditing type services from another organizational component, or that it would create an entirely new group to do
the in-house operationally oriented internal auditing. That new audit group
would likely move into the vacuum created by the partial or complete withdrawal of internal auditors from the operational area.
Exploring the Middle Ground
In between the two alternatives of exclusive service to corporate officers or
the audit committee is a spectrum of intermediate possibilities. W e w i l l , however, focus only on three alternatives: one of primary responsibility to the corporate management with a defined secondary responsibility to the audit committee; one of primary responsibility to the audit committee w i t h a defined
secondary responsibility to corporate management; and a third one involving
equal responsibility to the two users of audit services. In this range of alternatives, we use primary responsibility i n terms of the conventional solid-line type
of relationship, and secondary responsibility as the conventional dotted-line relationship. T h e solid line then indicates administrative control, but subject to
dotted-line types of responsibility to others that should be specifically defined.
W h e n there are two solid lines, we have the unusual organizational arrangement where responsibility and administrative direction are shared equally by
the two recipients on a partnership basis.
W h a t are the merits and disadvantages of these three types of organizational arrangements? Under the first named alternative—the solid line to corporate management and the dotted line to the audit committee—the internal
audit role to corporate management would stay much the same as now presently
exists. T h e dotted line responsibility to the audit committee would presumably
include periodic reporting—both i n writing and i n person—and immediate
access for each party to the other as deemed necessary. T h e responsibilities as
defined would probably state particular types and levels of required disclosure.
T h e advantages are that each party of interest might be able to gain satisfaction
of its needs for service without restricting the control needed by corporate management for achieving effective operations. T h e disadvantages are that there
might be some conflict of interest between the management and the board, and
that the board might then feel that it was not getting enough protective service
from the internal audit group to satisfy its expanding needs.
T h e reverse type of organizational arrangement—a solid line to the board
and a dotted line to corporate management—would of course put the audit
committee i n the position of top control and thus more fully satisfy governmental
pressures for very strong safeguards. It would, however, have the disadvantage
of tending to restrict corporate management i n its now existing use of internal
auditors i n the areas of operational auditing. There could also be some hostility
generated between the corporate management and the board. T h e benefits to
the internal auditor would, of course, be retention of ties to both client groups,
and therefore a total service role, but it would at the same time pose questions as
to whether both audit roles would be adequately fulfilled. A g a i n , corporate
management might feel the need for a new audit group which it could more
effectively control.
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T h e third alternative—the solid line to both parties of interest—appears on
the surface to be attractive because it asserts full service of the internal auditor
to both parties of interest. T h e major problem here, however, is whether such
a type of organizational arrangement is sound, or even realistic. C a n an internal
auditing group function under two administrators? Admittedly, there are some
situations where this has been tried with reasonable success. T h e project team,
with the dual responsibilities of the member to the project manager and to the
department from which the member has been assigned, is one example. However,
i n such a situation there is a higher level organizational authority which is
available to directly or indirectly resolve any major conflict. It is doubtful
whether such higher level arbiter exists as between corporate management and
the board i n any really practical sense. Hence, even though the idea of equal
joint responsibility may sound like a good solution, there is considerable doubt
whether it is satisfactory for the parties of interest, including the internal auditor.
W e reach this conclusion even though such equal responsibility may have been
made to work i n isolated situations through an extraordinarily cordial relationship between the chief executive officer and the chairman of the board.
Is there an Answer?
W h a t is the answer? Quite clearly, we have a number of trade-offs w h i c h
can never be resolved i n a manner that w i l l be fully satisfactory to all
parties of interest. There is also the continuing question of how the respective
roles and responsibilities of corporate management and the board of directors
are going to evolve i n the future. O n balance, it would appear—at least to this
author—that boards of directors cannot effectively take over the role of corporate
management. If they do, they w i l l need full-time people of the caliber of the
now existing corporate management. In such a situation it could well be that
the present top level corporate officers would become the board members and
simply have new titles. In that case, however, we would then need a new group
to monitor the board i n the discharge of their greater operational responsibilities
—that is, a k i n d of super board—in which case, we would be back about where
we had started. Possibly at this point, government might somehow take on the
super board role, but based on historical performance, greater governmental
control has brought w i t h it new problems which tend to be even more difficult
to solve than those previously existing. Hence, that does not seem to be a
good answer.
If the relationships stay much as they are now, but w i t h more enlightened
roles on the part of both corporate management and boards of directors, we
would, i n this writer's opinion, tend toward the internal audit department having a solid line responsibility to corporate management and a defined dotted
line to the board of directors—via the audit committee. In the case of corporate
management, it would then seem to be essential for the internal auditor to have
vice president status to demonstrate management commitment and to assure
needed independence i n carrying out an effective internal auditing role. T h e
internal auditor would then ideally report to the chief executive officer ( C E O ) .
However, the C E O might not have adequate time to provide the needed direction to the internal auditor, and i n such a situation the reporting responsibility
10

might well r u n to a senior vice president reporting directly to the C E O . Under
either of these reporting arrangements, the internal auditor should work closely
with the external auditor, and together they should work closely w i t h the audit
committee. In these circumstances, there would necessarily be a close partnership
relationship between the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, the
chairman of the audit committee, and the chairman of the board.
T h e advocacy of the arrangement just described i n no way denies that there
are serious obstacles to m a k i n g this arrangement work satisfactorily. It assumes,
first of all, that the cooperative effort outlined above could be generated and
sustained. T h e case for it is that there is, i n fact, a basic common interest on
the part of all participants for a well r u n , effective and profitable corporate enterprise. W h e n this common interest is sufficiently well understood, there can be
a sound basis for agreement and cooperative effort. T h e advocacy of the abovementioned reporting arrangement also carries w i t h it the major assumption that
the internal auditor has, or can develop, the needed capabilities to adequately
serve all the parties of interest. Proper organizational status is, of course, i m portant, but needed also is a sufficiently h i g h level of technical competence, an
understanding of the high level management and related policy issues which
are involved, and last but not least, the personal qualifications to be able to work
effectively w i t h h i g h ranking persons. T o develop these greater capabilities is
indeed an awesome challenge to internal auditors, although the record thus far
engenders confidence that it can be done. However, internal auditors w i l l have
to make proper plans and then implement them effectively.
Future Practice Directions
If the organizational arrangement for the internal auditor just described
is accepted—that is, primary responsibility to corporate management and defined secondary responsibility to the board of directors—what w i l l the impact
be on the nature and scope of internal auditing practice as internal auditors
strive to effectively discharge this combined service role? F r o m the author's
own perspective, the professional internal auditing practice w i l l involve four
key areas. First, the internal auditor w i l l continue to be the leader i n the
appraisal of the adequacy and effectiveness of systems of internal control covering all areas of corporate activity. These systems of internal control must now,
however, be broader i n scope to cover the areas of social concern earlier described.
T h e internal auditor w i l l , at the same time, properly play an active role i n the
required documentation of the adequacy of internal control to comply w i t h various types of new legislation. T h i s "control" role of the internal auditor is, i n
essence, an expanded and enriched version of the role which has i n recent years
been one of the major areas of service.
Secondly, the internal auditor w i l l continue to build upon the basic control
role to provide supplementary "operational a u d i t i n g " services pertaining to
managerial effectiveness and corporate profitability. T h e exposure to operations
provided through the analysis and appraisal of control is, as it has always been,
a most useful foundation for understanding and evaluating effective operational
performance. A n d quite clearly, the previously described expanded control role
w i l l provide the basis for a similarly expanded contribution i n the area of pro-
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moting operational effectiveness. T h i s particular service is especially important
when one considers that the current major emphasis by government and society
on protection tends to inhibit managerial risk taking and related entrepreneurial
operational actions upon which increased productivity and the welfare of society
ultimately depend.
T h i r d l y , the internal auditor w i l l certainly move into a new, higher level
of truly effective service to boards of directors via their audit committees. It is
assumed—based upon the previous analysis—that boards of directors and audit
committees continue to involve the part-time services of qualified and dedicated
persons. Under these conditions, audit committees may have small staffs, but i n
carrying out their roles, w i l l depend primarily on their interface w i t h corporate
management and information obtained from both the internal and external
audit groups. Here, as previously noted, they w i l l need to get certain periodic
reports and have the opportunity to supplement these reports with questions
and face to face discussions. A u d i t committees w i l l not necessarily administer
internal audit groups, but they need to be cognizant of how to support them and
how to best assure receiving adequate information about corporate operations.
T h i s needed information then becomes the basis for best assuring effective and
profitable results i n accordance w i t h proper legal and moral standards. T o help
provide that k i n d of service would surely be a newly expanded role of internal
auditors.
Fourthly, it seems to be inevitable that there w i l l be a still more effective
partnership relationship of the internal auditor w i t h the external auditor. Here
the often older relationship of superior and subordinate w i l l be replaced i n creasingly by a new partnership of professional equals w i t h mutual respect for
professional competence and a common interest i n service to the larger corporate
and social welfare. Clearly, the different primary mission of the external auditor
w i l l still require the right of supplementary review and appraisal of the work
of the internal auditor. But the two audit groups can at the same time exploit
their legitimate common interests by advance planning, which can then be
backed up by day-to-day liaison and cooperation to better insure the most effective, as well as the most economical, total audit effort. A forthcoming research
study by T h e Institute of Internal Auditors covering the relations of the internal
and external auditor w i l l examine i n further detail these cooperative efforts.
But we can here recognize the indicated partnership directions and the major
potentials for serving the needs of all parties of interest—corporate management,
boards of directors, government, and the larger total society.
Summary and Conclusions
In some forty years we have seen internal auditing emerge from a relatively
underdeveloped professional status to one of major importance i n terms of its
size and level of contribution. It has broadened its role from that of predominantly compliance and narrower financial auditing to include a major commitment to operational auditing. D u r i n g this period of time, a professional association was formed and reached substantial stature. A t the same time, a
comprehensive literature has been developed supported by sound research. W h i l e
internal auditing activities have always been, to some extent, related to those
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of the external auditor, these relationships have been weakened partially by the
movement of internal auditors into the broader operational auditing. But over
the years, internal auditing departments have grown and have commanded i n creasing strength and support by corporate management, external auditors, and
by boards of directors.
T h e new developments of our contemporary age, emerging principally
from the accelerated new expectations of society, have put new pressures on
corporate organizations, their boards of directors, and the independent external
auditors. There is a general demand for higher standards of integrity and
responsibility for socially oriented action. There is, at the same time, the focus
on the need for more effective systems of internal control. Since the internal
auditor is importantly concerned with the latter area, there is a new interest i n
the internal auditor's role i n helping to satisfy the newly expanded needs. These
developments have created special problems for the internal auditor i n determ i n i n g how best to provide internal audit services, and with what priorities.
A t the same time these problems, as is true for all problems, bring with them
great opportunities.
A s society proceeds to seek ways and means of better assuring the accomplishment of its newly expanding objectives, principally through legislation or
other types of governmental action, there is the ever critical need to move i n
such a way as best utilizes the capabilities of the various parties of interest—corporate management, boards of directors, the independent public accountants,
and last but not least, the internal auditors. It is important to avoid panic type
actions which could take the form of hasty legislation and related restrictions on
key participants, which would then prevent them from m a k i n g needed contributions. It is especially important not to penalize the majority by actions to get
protection from the relatively few offenders. Important also is the need to avoid
restrictions which could choke enterpreneurial risk taking and managerial
motivation which are such a basic requirement for the productivity of business
and the ultimate contribution to social welfare. It is, indeed, a time for thoughtful
and soundly determined action.
In the situation just described, internal auditors stand i n a particularly
strategic position. Possessing, as they do, special technical competence i n the
basic areas of internal control, and having been further indoctrinated i n the
broader areas of effective managerial results, they are especially well equipped
to make a major contribution. T h e danger, however, is that their role might
be too narrowly defined to serve exclusively the needs of groups which seek
protection as their key objective. There is a need for all parties of interest to
better understand the breadth of the services which can be provided by internal
auditors and to assure broader utilization of those services. In this connection,
internal auditors also have a responsibility to help develop that needed understanding—both i n their o w n self-interest and i n the broader social interest. A t
the same time, internal auditors must take major steps to prepare themselves to
adequately discharge the greater range and higher levels of service which appear to be potentially probable.
In total, this means new major opportunities for internal auditors i n the
way of further professional growth and development. It has been said that the
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time for the internal auditor has come. A n d others have said that internal auditi n g w i l l be a major growth area of the eighties. If, then, the time has come for
internal auditors, it is hoped that they w i l l do everything possible to develop
further capabilities to take advantage of the expanding opportunities. In all of
their endeavors, the internal auditors have a sound foundation i n history on
which to build, but they w i l l need the understanding and support of a l l parties
of interest.
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